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Taking the bull by its horns: the political economic logics of new
farm laws and agrarian dissent in India
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aCentre of African Studies, The University of Edinburgh Centre of African Studies, Edinburgh, UK; bSchool of
Tourism and Hospitality, University of Johannesburg, Auckland Park, South Africa; cDepartment of Geography,
Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, India
ABSTRACT
The Indian government’s latest series of farm laws (a set of three Acts)
have sparked protests by farmers around the country. This viewpoint
argues that the new farm laws are designed to deepen capitalism
within the countryside by liberalising agricultural trade. It highlights the
political economic logics of the new farm laws and outlines the
contradictions inherent in these laws. It also argues that agrarian
dissent is fractured along class lines and that we need broad
movements for social justice to address growing socio-economic






The Indian government passed a series of farm laws in September 2020, a collection of three Acts.
The laws were passed without much debate in parliament, despite repeated demands by opposition
parties to send the bills to a select parliamentary committee (Roy 2020). Immediately after the Acts
were passed, farmers’ protests began. The opposition parties and trade unions have voiced their
support for farmers against the three Acts (The Hindu 2020). A few state governments (such as
Punjab, Rajasthan, and Chhattisgarh) have approved legislations to counter the new laws. One
Union Minister (Minister of Food Processing Industries) has resigned from the government, stating
these laws to be ‘anti-farmer ordinances and legislation’. The Supreme Court of India has put a
hold on the laws until further orders. However, the government maintains these laws to be beneficial
for the agricultural sector and the farmers. The Prime Minister Narendra Modi tweeted
For decades, the Indian farmer was bound by various constraints and bullied by middlemen. The bills passed by
Parliament liberate the farmers from such adversities. These bills will add impetus to the efforts to double
income of farmers and ensure greater prosperity for them.
This commentary places the latest farm laws within the wider political economy of neoliberal reforms
in India that began in 1991. It argues that agrarian dissent in India is class-based and there is a need
for the current farmers’ protests to develop into a wider movement built around social justice.
Political economy of reforms in India
The 1990s was a period of new economic reforms in India, with measures such as removal of trade
barriers, allowing private investments in sectors previously reserved for state-owned firms such as
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defence, pharmaceuticals and information technology, devaluation of the currency, fiscal correction,
and financial sector reforms. While the Indian economy grew at an average of about 6% per annum
from the mid 1990s onwards (World Bank n.d), its performance in various development indicators
(such as poverty, income inequality, employment, child malnutrition) has been questioned by
various observers (see Corbridge, Harriss, and Jeffrey 2013). The post-reform period may be charac-
terised as a period of uneven development, with urban areas benefitting at the expense of rural
regions, where the bulk of the Indian population still lives (Corbridge, Harriss, and Jeffrey 2013).
Walker (2008), in her review of the neoliberal reforms in India and its impact on the agrarian
sector, argued that the pursuit of neoliberalism in India has increasingly involved forcible expropria-
tion of land. Walker argues that this has generated an agrarian crisis where capital (both domestic
and international) has benefitted through the dispossession of the rural poor. Specifically, the experi-
ence of neoliberal reforms over the last three decades has resulted in high-levels of smallholder
debts and agrarian distress. India has one of the highest rates of farmer suicide in the world
(Shakeel, Hussain, and Hashmi 2017). The official figures, from the National Crime Records Bureau
(NCRB), Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, for the period between 1995 and 2006
puts the total number of farmer suicides at 190,753, which translates to approximately 16,000
every year (Nagaraj 2008).
Overall, the agrarian situation in the country has been marked by agrarian class conflict. The abol-
ition of the feudal (Zamindari) system in the 1950s generated class conflicts between the upper
classes (the landed gentry) and landless peasants (Lerche 2013). Similarly, the Green Revolution of
the 1970s, which made India self-sufficient in food grain production, primarily benefitted landowners
from the upper classes, who had traditionally been large scale landowners (Jodhka 2012). The neo-
liberal reforms of the 1990s further deepened the divide between the wealthy rural elites and the
poor peasantry (which includes agricultural labourers, landless peasants and small and medium
land holders) (see Corbridge, Harriss, and Jeffrey 2013). Accordingly, the current series of farm
laws can be seen as a continuation of reforms in the marketing and distribution side of the agricul-
tural sector.
The idea of deregulated agricultural markets has been debated within Indian policy circles since
the early 2000s. In 2001, the Guru Committee on Marketing Infrastructure & Agricultural Marketing
Reforms, set up by the then BJP-led NDA government, published its 74-page report (Ministry of Agri-
culture 2001). Some of the report’s recommendations are worth highlighting here. The report rec-
ommended that ‘in promoting vibrant competitive marketing systems, the Government needs to
examine all existing policies, rules and regulations with a view to remove all legal provisions inhibit-
ing a free marketing system’ (Ministry of Agriculture 2001, 4). The report went on to make specific
recommendations and says,
The Essential Commodities Act, 1955 which has resulted in restrictions on storage and free movement of stocks,
initiative by the trade in innovation and investment, should be repealed to make way for play of free market
forces in real sense… The Committee suggests promotion of direct marketing as one of the alternative market-
ing structures that sustain incentives for quality and enhanced productivity, reduce distribution losses, improv-
ing farmer incomes with improved technology support and methods. The market will operate outside the
purview of the Agricultural Produce Marketing Act and will be owned by professional agencies in the private
sector, wholesalers, trade associations and other investors. The government’s role should be that of a facilitator
rather than that of having control over the management of the markets. (Ministry of Agriculture 2001, 6)
A close reading of the new farm laws will reveal that the current government has more or less
adopted these recommendations.
What is in the new laws?
The acts in question are the Farmers’ Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation) Act
(FPTCA), 2020; the Farmers (Empowerment and Protection) Agreement on Price Assurance and Farm
Services Act (FAPAFSA), 2020, and the Essential Commodities (Amendment) Act (ECA), 2020. The
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FAPAFSA enables farmers to enter into a ‘farming agreement’ or contract farming with the ‘sponsor’:
the person who will buy the produce from the farmer at a pre-decided price. Both parties can enter
into the agreement with mutually acceptable quality, grades and standards of produce. The Act also
allows the agreement to be altered or terminated at any time with mutual consent for ‘any reason-
able cause’.
The FPTCA allows intra and inter-state trade and commerce in agricultural produce. It also allows
for electronic trading and transaction platforms to facilitate the trade. The Agricultural Produce Mar-
keting Committees (APMC) had previously levied taxes allowing respective states to raise revenue.
Under the new act, no such levy is allowed by the state under the APMC act or any other state
laws. In essence, the government’s rationale is that this will encourage farmers to directly sell
their produce outside mandis (or market yards), pre-approved under the APMC model Act 1955,
to big businesses and retailers, possibly procuring better prices.
The amendment to the ECA has removed certain key products such as oilseeds, pulses, edible oils,
potato, and onion from the essential commodities list. It also terminates the checks imposed on the
stock-holding limits of essential commodities (except under special circumstances). In essence, there
will be no restrictions on the hoarding of essential commodities.
The government’s introduction of these laws is a clear signal of radical deregulation and privati-
sation of the agricultural sector in the country. In many ways, under the garb of free markets and free
trade (or neoliberalism) the government is relinquishing its primary development role in the Indian
political economy during the particularly distressing time of the COVID-19 pandemic.
More than ‘Mandis’
The APMC-mandated mandis in various states play an important role in agricultural trade in India,
providing farmers with access to markets.1 Only licensed traders as middlemen are allowed to
buy food grains from farmers at set prices determined through auctions. These middlemen would
then sell to buyers like retailers and large traders. Farmers receive payments within a particular
time period. The APMCs also hear grievances and oversee malpractices in the sale and purchase
of produce.
Indeed, mandis have their own problems. Farmers in many instances do not get fair prices
through mandis due to various intermediaries. But to think that farmers will be able to directly
sell their produce in open markets in the hopes of procuring higher prices is wishful thinking.
Take for example the state of Bihar, which scrapped the APMCmandis 14 years ago; there is evidence
of farmers selling rice in private markets at half the prices fixed by the Central government as MSP
(Manoj 2020). Furthermore, it is not easy to move agricultural goods over large distances without
access to proper transportation, logistics, and storage infrastructure. While the rich peasantry can
absorb the cost and can potentially benefit from the new arrangements, for small and marginal
farmers this is unreasonable.
The current government’s argument for the deregulation of these markets is that an increase in
private sector investment in agricultural marketing will result in better prices for farmers. But this
idea needs a reality check. The pandemic has slowed most economic activities around the world.
Governments have stepped in to provide emergency support to ailing businesses and workers at
a time when the private sector has been scaling back. Thus, the Indian government’s move to
depend on the private sector for investment in times of uncertainty is a huge misjudgement on
its part.
Furthermore, the government has put enormous focus on technology (such as price information,
market intelligence systems, and electronic trading platforms) in the hope of eliminating market
deficiencies and removing the middlemen. Indeed, disintermediation in the market may result in
higher prices for farmers as they can sell directly to the retailer.2 However, in practice this is a
fantasy. Much of the farm produce in rural India is already sold outside the APMCs’ mandate
(Mitra 2020), especially by small and marginal landholding farmers (about 86% of the farmers in
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India). The majority of these farmers depend on buyers and brokers to get their produce to the
markets. Agricultural markets in towns and villages of India are littered with these middlemen.
While some middlemen at the APMCs (such as agents and lenders) might be removed through
direct trade in open markets, the possibilities for new forms of reintermediation are endless. New
intermediaries such as local and regional mid-level buyers, lenders, transport suppliers, and
traders are very likely to emerge, which opens up the space for price manipulation.
Prices of agricultural goods are determined not just by their overall supply and demand in the
market, but also by who has the power in the supply chains. Allowing farmers to directly engage
in trade of their produce with the private sector will lead to enhanced potential for collusion by
new agents, who may engage in unfair and stealthy practices to keep the prices down (for
example, not buying the goods on time; collusion by agents is well known in the Indian agriculture
market. See, for example, Banerji and Meenakshi 2004). The perishable nature of most agricultural
goods means big businesses and retailers can leverage it to buy goods at below the market price.
This is where the APMC-mandated mandis provided a crucial link between farmers and buyers by
affording them legal protection against malpractices and fraud.3 Removing such links only exposes
the farmers to further risks (such as fluctuating prices and lack of legal protection). Under the new
laws, farmers unions (key for their collective bargaining) will have little involvement in various farm
disputes, which will be dealt with by a magistrate. The disputes related to trade under the FPTCA
cannot be challenged in the civil courts while the higher judiciary remains practically beyond the
reach of most farmers in the country.
Furthermore, there are contradictions inherent in the government’s vision for the marketing of
agricultural produce outside APMC-mandated mandis. The share of public investment in agriculture
(such as for developing infrastructure for market development) has declined since the 1980s (Golait
and Lokare 2008). While food production may have increased, poor infrastructural facilities such as
storage and transport result in high levels of food wastage, which has implications for food security.
The contradictions of MSPs and food insecurity
The three pillars of the food security system in India are MSPs, public procurement of food grains,
and Public Distribution Systems (PDS), which the new laws threaten. The National Food Security
Act (NFSA) of 2013 was introduced to provide subsidised food grains to the poorest segments of
the Indian population.
The Food Corporation of India (FCI) procures food grains at an MSP and maintains a buffer stock
for emergencies such as war, drought, and flood. The government norms say that a buffer stock of 20
million tonnes and a strategic reserve of 5 million tonnes is to be maintained. During the last few
years the buffer stock with FCI has increased, creating pressure on limited storage capacity. By
April 2021, the FCI had just over 80 million tonnes of food grains in storage, well over the buffer
norms (Press Information Bureau 2020). Despite this, food insecurity and malnutrition are still preva-
lent in India (Shakeel 2018). The government’s intention to put a check on public procurement is
intended to reduce financial burden on the exchequer.
The Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices’ (CACP) has recently recommended reviewing
the government’s open-ended procurement and shifting towards private procurement to correct
market inefficiencies. In recent years, MSPs for a number of critical crops such as wheat, rice, and
maize have also remained higher than the open market rates, with the increased input costs,
large buffer stock, and the economic downturn all affecting prices. The Cabinet Committee on Econ-
omic Affairs has already declared an increase in the MSP of all mandated rabi crops for the 2020–21
seasons (cf. EPW 2020). These MSPs have been crucial for farmers during times of drought or crop
failure.4 While an MSP is announced for more than 20 crops, not every crop is procured by the gov-
ernment.5 If the government stops procuring food grains at MSPs, then it cannot supply subsidised
essential commodities to India’s poor through a network of fair price shops, thus making the PDS and
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the fair price shops largely irrelevant. For the poor of India, this is bad news, with higher food costs
and consequences for malnutrition.
Under the FPTCA, much of the auction of food grains would shift outside the APMC mandis,
making them less relevant for MSPs. Farmers fear that APMC mandis will be slowly phased out,
leaving them vulnerable to price shocks in the absence of MSPs (NDTV 2020). Allowing trade on
open markets to private buyers without the proper guidelines of MSPs would likely result in big
buyers arm-twisting farmers to sell produce at lower prices. There is no guideline in the new laws
that prevents retailers or private buyers from buying at below the MSP. The prices are to be
solely determined by mutual agreement between a farmer and agribusinesses, large retailers, or
exporters. The risk here is that agribusinesses will leverage their value chain positions to enter
into a contract with lower prices. Large transnational agricultural traders often hedge their purchases
to protect from price spikes (Financial Times 2010).
Before the implementation of the ECA, the government procured and stored food grains alongwith
private traders, but with a hoarding limit. Now the hoarding restrictions have been removed, risking
intensifying hunger amidst plenty (Haynes 2008). This can significantly affect the supply and prices
of food grains locally.6 There are other kinds of dangers. The removal of hoarding and a greater role
for the private sector means there are risks of increasing financialisation and a greater space for
largemultinational trading corporations (along with private equity firms) within the Indian agricultural
sector now. Increasing financialisationwithin the agricultural systemhas been a driving factor in global
land grabbing by the private sector, with the active complicity of the state (see Cotula et al. 2009). India
already has its own fractious experience of land grabbing, both through state-directed infrastructural
projects such as dams (see Gadgil and Guha 2005) and the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) (see Levien
2018; Anwar and Carmody 2016). There are real dangers of further displacement and dispossession in
the countryside and fuelling of agrarian dissent in the country.
Agrarian dissent in India
There is a farm crisis in India and the Indian peasantry’s discontent is on the rise. In March 2018,
40,000 farmers came together in Mumbai to demand land rights, better compensation, and
support to the farming sector. In November that year, tens of thousands of farmers marched on
the national capital demanding debt waivers and higher crop prices (AlJazeera 2018). In 2020, the
first nine months saw more than 50 major farmers’ protests in India (Pandey 2020). The importance
of the agrarian question in India’s context has become ever more relevant in the context of the new
laws and the farmers’ protests. The peasantry finds itself disenfranchised and its discontent towards
the ruling class is visible in its recurrent protests against the encroachment of capitalism into the
countryside.
The deepening of agrarian capitalism in India did not necessarily lead towards industrialisation in
the classical sense. Since the 1970s, the contribution of agriculture towards the national economic
output has declined but the percentage of population dependent on it is still over 50% (Economic
Survey of India 2019–2020). While landlordism has declined, those with access to land attempt to
seek rent from it. Rich peasantry or large land owners have also gained positions away from the
countryside, within urban areas, through investments, access to political power, and public sector
jobs (Levien 2018). However, the uneven developments that characterise agrarian capitalism in
India mean that there are variations in terms of opposition to such transitions across the country
(Lerche 2013). Put differently, agrarian dissent in India is class-based.
Take for example, the SEZ Act 2005. This was passed to catalyse the industrial and services sector
through the expropriation of land with the help of the state (Anwar 2014). The protest movements
against land acquisition for SEZs were very diverse nationally. In West Bengal and Orissa, the poor
peasantry’s movements was directed against accumulation by dispossession (most notably in
Nandigram) and faced state-directed violence and repression. However, in Haryana and Rajasthan
the large landowning class’ resistance efforts were targeted at the government’s handling of land
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acquisitions and monetary compensation, but not necessarily for the struggle against dispossession
(see Kennedy 2020; Levien 2018; Anwar and Carmody 2016).
Similarly, while protests against the new farm laws have taken place in various states across
the country, they have been more intense in the food basket states of India, namely Punjab,
Haryana and some parts of the western Uttar Pradesh, often among large land-holding farmers
(Haq 2020). As of January 2021, the Supreme Court of India has a put a stay on these new
laws, but the farmers’ protest movement continues. It is too early to predict the mobilising struc-
tures and the distinct forms or trajectories these protests will take in the near future. The protest
movement has also drawn support from states such as Kerala, Karnataka, and Gujarat (the home
state of Prime Minister Modi) and is gaining further momentum (Kumar 2021; Schmall 2020).
Thus, there is a need to understand class structure within these movements and also to contex-
tualise this within the regional agrarian trajectories.
No doubt the new laws are aimed at weakening the socio-political and economic structures of
rural India and deepening the penetration of agri-businesses in the countryside. Farmers have
genuine concerns that the government is trying to dispense with the MSP regime and public pro-
curement. But this will affect different types of farmers differently. As Lerche (2013) argues, in a
diverse political and social environment as in India, there is a need to think not of a single agrar-
ian question, but various different regionally specific agrarian questions.
One of those questions should focus on resistance against neoliberalism in India. This is not to say
there is no space for redistributive reforms and/or effective regulation. Indeed, they are critical for
wider welfare across the country. But the point here is that building grassroots movements
remains at the core of a thriving democratic system, which is under increasing threat in India
under the current Modi government.7 Furthermore, the tragedy of India’s experience of neoliberal
reforms has been not just the adverse implications for the poor but a lack of revolution (Das
2015).8 While there has been some peasant resistance from below, best symbolised through move-
ments such as Narmada Bachao Andolan (see Routledge 2003), and diverse nationwide resistance
movements against Special Economic Zones, the revival of old-style class struggles is much
needed in the current times. This class struggle could take distinct local forms, but could also
connect to the wider national coalitions for social justice built around broad-based welfare
schemes and effective regulation. As one of India’s leading rural affairs experts, Palagummi
Sainath, recently said in a public lecture,
amid the incredible growth of inequality in India; amid the scenario when dissent has been criminalised; when
policies of the state and corporates are designed to fail the poor; and moral universe of the state has shifted,
then the solution lies in “going back to battles of justice”. (The Tribune 2018)
Notes
1. Though the functioning and regulation of mandis vary from state to state.
2. Disintermediation refers to the removal of intermediaries in a value chain, or cutting out the middleman.
3. Though, in practice, access to proper legal protection among farmers is a luxury (Datla 2020).
4. Some observers noted that hikes in MSPs only benefit a handful of farmers (Hussain 2018).
5. The government sets prices for just around two dozen crops and buys mainly wheat and rice, along with pulses
and a few oilseeds. It then distributes these commodities through a chain of government regulated shops col-
loquially referred to as ration shops.
6. Late last year in 2019, Prime Minister Modi’s government had imposed hoarding limit on onions at 50,000 kilo-
grams for wholesale traders and 10,000 kilograms for retailers.
7. The Democracy under Siege report in 2021 by Freedom House, a US-based think tank, noted that ‘political rights
and civil liberties in the country have deteriorated since Narendra Modi became prime minister in 2014’ and
categorised India as ‘partly free’ (Repucci and Slipowitz 2021, 7).
8. It is worth noting that some of the Modi government’s policies such as the Citizenship Amendment Act 2019
have generated mass dissent and social movements (e.g., Shaheen Bagh protest in New Delhi led primarily
by women).
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